{"id":47,"date":"2025-05-18T17:41:39","date_gmt":"2025-05-18T17:41:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/?p=47"},"modified":"2025-05-18T17:41:40","modified_gmt":"2025-05-18T17:41:40","slug":"russia-ukraine-after-three-years-of-large-scale-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/?p=47","title":{"rendered":"Russia-Ukraine after three years of large-scale war"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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MECKLENBURG, GERMANY – JUNE 11: Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, (2L) and Boris Pistorius, (3L) Federal Minister of Defense are seen visiting the training of Ukrainian soldiers on the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system at a military training ground on June 11, 2024 in Mecklenburg, Germany. The international reconstruction conference for Ukraine will take place on 11 and 12 June Zelensky is in Berlin to also attend the Ukrainian Recovery Conference. Germany is the second biggest donor of military aid to Ukraine. (Photo by Jens B\u00fcttner – Pool\/Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

February 24 marks the third anniversary of Russia\u2019s all-out assault on Ukraine. The Kremlin failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory, and the war has become one of attrition, with neither side making dramatic breakthroughs on the battlefield. Russia had momentum in 2024 but recorded only modest territorial gains and failed to evict Ukrainian forces from Russia\u2019s Kursk region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Donald Trump\u2019s bid to broker an end to the fighting has been marked by early missteps. Reaching a durable settlement will require that both sides, particularly the Russians, move off of deeply entrenched positions. Absent a well-conceived strategy for brokering an agreement, the president\u2019s mediation attempt will fail, and the war will continue. What happens matters to the United States. Should the Kremlin win\u2014either on the battlefield or as the result of a shoddy deal\u2014Russia will pose an even larger threat to Europe and to key American interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A long and costly conflict<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Russia-Ukraine war, the bloodiest in Europe since World War II, began 11 years ago. Following Ukraine\u2019s Maidan Revolution<\/a>, Russian forces seized Crimea in early 2014. Russia subsequently became involved in fighting in the Donbas, which left Russian and Russian proxy forces occupying parts of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s multi-vector invasion<\/a> on February 24, 2022, appeared to have two objectives: quickly take Kyiv, and occupy the eastern one-half to two-thirds of Ukraine. To the surprise of virtually all, Ukrainian forces stopped the Russian army short of the capital, drove it out of the north, and later launched successful counteroffensives in the east and south. The Ukrainians <\/p>\n\n\n\n

launched further counteroffensives in 2023, but equipment limitations and extensive Russian defensive fortifications stymied those operations. By early 2024, the war had become one of attrition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine\u2019s military, which musters about 900,000 compared to 1.3 million<\/a> for Russia, has struggled with manpower issues<\/a>, though it is trying new ways to attract recruits. As they have since 2022, the Ukrainians remain critically dependent on Western weapons and munitions. The Trump administration has not sought new congressional funding for military assistance for Kyiv, which means the flow of U.S. weapons at some point will cease, as it did when funding ran out in late 2023 (that hurt Ukraine<\/a>). Europe\u2019s defense industrial base would have a difficult time meeting Ukrainian needs on its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If one side had momentum in 2024, it was the Russians, but they secured only limited territorial gains. At the beginning of 2025, the Russian military controlled about 18% of Ukraine\u2019s territory. It added 1,500 square miles<\/a> over the course of 2024, but that amounts to less than 1% of Ukraine. The Russian military has failed to reclaim part of Russia\u2019s Kursk region that the Ukrainian army seized in August.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russians have paid an enormous cost<\/a>over the past three years, by one estimate suffering 172,000 dead and 611,000 wounded, many of them severely. (While the Ukrainians have also suffered heavy casualties, they are believed to be significantly less.) The Russians have also suffered huge equipment losses, including some 14,000 main battle tanks and armored vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wide differences separate Russian and Ukrainian conditions for peace<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s 2022 decision to invade increasingly looks like an epic blunder, but he has continued the war, despite rising costs that also include sanctions on Russia. He placed his economy on a war footing and believes Russia can\u00a0outlast Ukraine, given its larger population and economy. He has shown no serious interest in negotiating except on his terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin fundamentally does not accept\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s right to exist\u00a0as a sovereign and independent state. He\u00a0initially demandedthat Ukraine demilitarize, accept neutrality, and recognize Crimea as Russian and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk \u201cpeople\u2019s republics\u201d as independent states. In September 2022, Putin\u00a0supposedly annexed\u00a0Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson\u2014even though Russian forces did not occupy all of those territories. He made Kyiv\u2019s acceptance of those annexations a condition for a settlement. It is not just land but the people on the land that are under Russian occupation. Those areas have been described as \u201ca totalitarian hell\u201d where \u201call traces of Ukraine are being expunged.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

February 24 marks the third anniversary of Russia\u2019s all-out assault on Ukraine. The Kremlin failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory, and the war has become one of … <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":49,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-47","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=47"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":50,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47\/revisions\/50"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/49"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=47"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=47"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.landingliker.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=47"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}